Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2012

Delta Canal Company; Melville Irrigation
Company; Abraham Irrigation Company; Deseret
Irrigation Company; and Central Utah Water
Company v. Frank Vincent Family Ranch LC:
DMADC Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edwin C. Barnes; Steven E. Clyde; Clyde Snow & Sessions; Attorneys for Appellees.
John H. Mabey, Jr.; David C. Wright; Mabey Wright & James, PLLC; Richard T. Waddingham;
Waddingham & Associates; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Delta Canal Company; Melville Irrigation Company; Abraham Irrigation Company; Deseret Irrigation Company; and Central
Utah Water Company v. Frank Vincent Family Ranch LC: DMADC Reply Brief, No. 20120470.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2012).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3172

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

DELTA CANAL COMPANY;
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY;
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY;
DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY;
and CENTRAL UTAH WATER
COMPANY,

Appeal No. 20120470

Appellants,
vs.
FRANK VINCENT FAMILY RANCH, LC

(Fourth District Court Case No.
080700087)

Appellee.

An appeal from a judgment of the Fourth District Court, Millard County
The Honorable James Brady
DMADC REPLY BRIEF
Edwin C. Barnes
Steven E. Clyde
Clyde Snow & Sessions
201 South Main, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Frank Vincent
Family Ranch, LC

John H. Mabey, Jr. - 4625
David C. Wright - 5566
MABEY WRIGHT & JAMES, PLLC
175 South Main, #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-359-3663
Fax: 801- 359-3673
R: ?~n
Richard T. WaddinghlrffiAH APPELLATE COURTS

WADDINGHAM & Assoc.

Attorneys for DMADC

UAD
MAR

_
" '

?

^

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

DELTA CANAL COMPANY;
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY;
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY;
DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY;
and CENTRAL UTAH WATER
COMPANY,

Appeal No. 20120470

Appellants,
vs.
FRANK VINCENT FAMILY RANCH, LC

(Fourth District Court Case No.
080700087)

Appellee.

An appeal from a judgment of the Fourth District Court, Millard County
The Honorable James Brady
DMADC REPLY B R I E F
Edwin C. Barnes
Steven E. Clyde
Clyde Snow & Sessions
201 South Main, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Frank Vincent
Family Ranch, LC

John H. Mabey, Jr. - 4625
David C. Wright - 5566
MABEY W R I G H T & JAMES, PLLC
175 South Main, #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801- 359-3663
Fax: 801- 359-3673
Richard T. Waddingham
WADDINGHAM & Assoc.

Attorneys for DMADC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

1

A.

ROCKY FORD RECOGNIZED PARTIAL FORFEITURE

L

Partial loss was established before Rocky Ford.

1

1

2. This Court ys later references to Rocky Ford did not require a partial loss
analysis

3

3.

4

The State Engineer does not claim to decide partial loss

B. VINCENT MAKES A NUMBER OF UNSUPPORTED AND INCORRECT FACTUAL
ASSERTIONS, SOME OF WHICH RAISE NEW ISSUES

5

C.

8

VINCENT'S RIGHT IS MEASURED BY BENEFICIAL USE

1.

The Cox Decree does not recognize a "pre-irrigation" season

2.

Vincent did not establish a physical causes defense

10

3.

Vincent equivocates on use

15

D.

SECTION 73-1-4 DOES NOT GOVERN THE ABANDONMENT CLAIM

9

16

1.

The 2008 amendments clarified the statute

16

2.

The law on abandonment continued to develop outside of section 73-1-4

18

CONCLUSION

21

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Becker v. Marble Creek Irr. Co., 49 P. 892 (Utah 1897)

1, 2, 3

Butler, Crockett, etc. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Op. Co., 2004 UT 67, ^[56 n.7, 98 P.3d 1 3, 11,
16
County Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954)

21

East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 271 P.2d 449,453 (Utah 1954), on appeal from
retrial, 300 P.2d 603 (Utah 1956

11

Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 775 n.9 (Utah 1991)

3, 4

Hammond v. Johnson etal, 66 P.2d 894, 899 (Utah 1937),

19, 20

Huntsville Irr. Ass 'n v. Dist. Court of Weber County, 270 P. 1090, 1093 (Utah 1928)

4

In Re Waters of Manse Spring, 108P.2d311 (Nev. 1940)....

2

Jensen v. Jones, 2011 UT 31, 270 P.3d 425

4, 18

Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 289 P. 116, 117 (Utah 1930)

4

Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990)

5

Provo River, etc. v. Lambert, 642 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1982)

19

Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v. City of Richfield, 34 P.2d 945, 949 (Utah 1934)("

8

Richfield Cottonwood, 34 P.2d at 949

8
4

Rocky FordIrrig. Co. v. Kents Lake Res. Co., 135 P. 2d 108 (Utah 1943)

1, 2, 3,

7,10,11,12,19,21
Rosenblum v. Gomoll, 173 P. 243, 244-45 (Utah 1918)

iv

19

<

State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, ^2, 75 P.3d 923

15

State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^14, 128 P.3d 1171

5

Stern v. Metro. Water Dist, 2012 UT 16, W8-80, 274 P.3d935

18

Torsakv. Rukavina, 246 P. 367 (Utah 1926)

18

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10,^9, 179P.3d768

19

Wellsville East Field Irrig. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 137 P.2d 634 (Utah
1943)

19
Statutes (UTAH CODE ANN.)

§57-1-1(3)

19

§73-1-3

1,8

§73-1-4

16,17, 18, 19, 20

§73-l-4(2)(a)

16,18

§73-l-4(2)(c)(i)(2009)

17

§73-l-4(2)(e)(iii)

10

§73-l-4(3)(a) (2002)

17

§73-l-4(3)(c)(i)

17

§73-3-17(1)

8

§73-4-3(3)(a)

4

§73-4-11

4,8

§73-4-12,-15

...8

Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, §2498.10

19

v

Other Authorities
http://www.waterrights.utah.gov/cgi-bin/docview.exe?Folder=TP20-5750&Title=Technical+Publication+74

15

Utah Const. Art I, §7

19
Rules

UTAH R.APP.

P. 24(a)(9)

UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(f)(2)

5
20

i

I

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Vincent asks for a pre-2002 water use rule that undermines water law's most basic
tenet—that beneficial use defines a water right. The problem is not that Vincent fails to
acknowledge the policy and even the bedrock wisdom of beneficial use. It does. Vincent
argues instead, without explanation, that the rule does not apply here. This Court adopted
the principal of partial loss at least as early as 1897 and applied it in Rocky Ford in 1943.
The trial court erred when it decided that the use of some amount of water
preserved the whole.

Its other errors cascade from that flawed understanding of

beneficial use.
References to Vincent's brief are "(V Brf p #)."
ARGUMENT

A. Rocky Ford recognized partial forfeiture.
1. Partial loss was established before Rocky Ford
Vincent argues that Rocky Fordlrrig. Co. v. Rents Lake Res. Co., 135 P. 2d 108
(Utah 1943) did not establish partial loss as "a feature of Utah law," and that it did not
become so until codified in 2002. (V Brf 32-33). Vincent is correct on a narrow point—
Rocky Ford was not this Court's first statement on that question. An early and previously
cited example is Becker v. Marble CreekIrr. Co., 49 P. 892 (Utah 1897):
The great weight of modern authority is to the effect that when an
appropriator permits part of the water appropriated to run to waste,
or fails to use a certain portion of it for some beneficial use or
1

DMADC uses the phrase "partial loss" so that the analysis includes both forfeiture and
abandonment. Section 73-1-3's definition makes no distinction whether the failure to use
water beneficially is voluntary.
1

purpose, he can only hold that part of the water which has been
actually applied to a beneficial use, and his right is limited to the
quantity so used.
49 P. at 893.
Against this, and this Court's many references to beneficial use, Vincent contends,
on its own authority, that "[t]he common understanding before [2002] was that the use of
any portion of a water right preserved the whole." (V Brf at 32). That dangerously odd
notion was not common.

See> e.g., Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and

Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 Envtl. L. 919,
928-29(1998).
Rocky Ford was (presumably) this Court's first opportunity to apply partial loss.
If Becker and similar decisions had not already established partial loss, it makes no sense
for Rocky Ford to trouble with the analysis—whether Kents Lake was exposed to
forfeiture at all, and if so, during what years and in what amounts—if partial loss was
never at stake. Vincent misses Rocky Ford's most relevant feature—only a portion of the
right was at risk. This Court concluded that "Kents Lake has not forfeited any of its . . .
r i g h t . . . . " 135P.2datll4.
Rocky Ford cites In Re Waters of Manse Spring, 108 P.2d 311 (Nev. 1940).
There, the Nevada Supreme Court touched on the question Rocky Ford answered—that
beneficial use defines the right and that waste in any amount risks that amount. The
courts must "check" waste and "appreciate the necessity of requiring that water be
beneficially used . . . .

Manse Spring, 108 P.2d at 316, cited in Rocky Ford, 135 P.2d at

111.
2

2. This Court's later references to Rocky Ford did not require a partial
loss analysis.
Since Rocky Ford, this Court twice stated that it had not recognized partial loss, in
Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 775 n.9 (Utah 1991), and Butler, Crockett, etc.
v. Pinecrest Pipeline Op. Co., 2004 UT 67, T|56 n.7, 98 P.3d 1. DMADC did not cite to
Butler and Eskelsen for the simple reason that, unlike Rocky Ford, those cases did not
undertake the analysis, and DMADC had a word limitation. It made no sense to use
restricted space on cases notable chiefly because they do not address the issue at hand.
Furthermore, this Court was understandably mistaken about those cases. Neither
Butler nor Eskelsen triggered a partial loss analysis. The Court did not have to apply
Rocky Ford. Had either case required it, a closer look at Rocky Ford would undoubtedly
have occurred. Eskelsen acknowledges, however, the same rule in Becker and that was
implicit in Rocky Ford, that forfeiture is evaluated with beneficial use in mind. Eskelsen,
819 P.2d at 775-76.
Rocky Ford explained the forfeiture test, which is based on the failure to use
"available" water, and at least two of its defenses—full use during at least one year of the
challenged period and "physical causes" preventing use. 135 P.2d at 111. Kents Lake
survived, not because partial loss was not possible, but only because it used all of its
available water during one of the subject years. Id. at 113.

DMADC cited to Butler several times, and so was obviously aware of it, and cited
Eskelsen's footnote 9 below. (R. 384).
3

3. The State Engineer does not claim to decide partial loss.
Vincent scolds the State Engineer for arguing that a water right always has been
subject to partial loss.

(V Brief 36).

The State Engineer nowhere argues that it

adjudicates or determines forfeiture or abandonment, partial or otherwise. And nothing
either the State Engineer or DMADC argued is contrary to Jensen v. Jones, 2011 UT 31,
270P.3d425. 3
The general determination process requires the State Engineer to evaluate water
use. UTAH CODE ANN. §73-4-3 (3)(a). The resulting proposal establishes the water right
but only in so far as the user does not object. If the use analysis is disputed, the issue is
decided by the court, where beneficial use is tested and the right is determined. §§73-411,12.
The state is a party to the general determination to police beneficial use, not to
decide partial loss. Its role is to among other things "provide means whereby [it] might
have the opportunity to see that water users in their claims were restricted to a beneficial
use

" Huntsville Irr. Ass'n v. Dist. Court of Weber County, 270 P. 1090, 1093 (Utah

1928).4

The State Engineer does not argue that it has "partial forfeiture powers." (V Brf 36).
That statute explains the Engineer's duties. The ultimate determination "of existing
[water] rights . . . [remains] peculiarly a judicial function." Little Cottonwood Water Co.
v. Kimball, 289 P. 116, 117 (Utah 1930), quoted in Jensen, 2011 UT 31, flO.
4
Vincent distinguishes this case from the State Engineer's hypotheticals. (V Brf 35, 36).
This case may not involve those extremes, but Vincent is responsible for the rule of law it
seeks. Under its casual notions of pre-2002 law, the State Engineer's hypotheticals are
the logical result, as this Court already surmised. Eskelsen, 819 P.2d at 775 n. 9 (no
partial forfeiture "would mean that the use of any part of a water right, no matter how
small, would preserve the whole.").
4

The State Engineer explains its role, and in note 5 provides an illustrative
example. A claimant began with a decreed right for 800 irrigated acres. In a subsequent
general determination 66 years later, the user was cut back to its actual beneficial use of
546.26 acres (which included other supplemental rights), resulting in a new partial
decree. (Amicus Brf at 15, n.5).
B. Vincent makes a number of unsupported and incorrect factual assertions,
some of which raise new issues.
This Court "do[es] not consider new evidence on appeal." Low v. Bonacci, 788
P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990). Furthermore, "[w]hen a party raises an [unpreserved] issue,
[this Court] require[s] that the party articulate an appropriate justification for appellate
review; specifically,

the party must argue either plain error or exceptional

circumstance[s]." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^[14, 128 P.3d 1171(citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Facts must be supported by record cites. UTAH R. APP. P.
24(a)(9).
Vincent argues facts as though the case was tried and findings were made.
Vincent's brief is peppered with unsupported and incorrect assertions, injecting new
issues. Among the more egregious is this:
There was no timely objection to Water Right No. 68-3002 as set
forth in the [PD] and that relevant portion of the [PD] was confirmed
and adopted in the Cox Decree. {See R. at 166-70, 255-60.)
(VBrfl0f7).
Nothing in the record supports this claim. There were objections, "heard and
determined" by the court. (R 166, 255). On the duty question, for example, the Cox

5

Decree contains no reference to an irrigation duty for Vincent's right.

The PD's

reference to "5,000 acre feet" (R. 125) does not appear in the Cox Decree.
Vincent's factual narrative (some of which is offered for the first time) was
directly disputed. (R. 237-41; R. 627-32). Vincent asserts that it
deliberately diverts water to specific areas . . . to proliferate the
growth . . . for winter cattle grazing and to support its commercial
bird operation....
A successful hunt requires dense vegetation where the birds can hide
. . . . The [native vegetation] does not provide sufficient cover . . . .
(V Brf 24; see also id. at 21).
There are no such findings. These facts were disputed with expert testimony that
the alleged irrigation of native plants did not enhance what nature does on its own. (R.
301-02).

Robert Morgan, former Utah State Engineer, determined that Vincent's

sporadic use on the uncultivated desert "was not and is not a beneficial use of that water."
(R. 335).5 A survey established that a total of approximately nine acres of "wildlife
habitat" was irrigated. Topography alone prevents much of this alleged irrigation. (R.
314-21). Vincent tried to move water to this "habitat" while this case was being litigated,
including between expert site visits. (R. 320-21). See R. 237-241. The trial court
concluded that "[w]hether some of the water Vincent uses is put to a beneficial use," and
"[t]he amount" used on the habitat area" were both disputed. (R. 415).
Vincent contends that reduced river flows require that it plan based on
"scheduled" delivery, and that any "additional" water is used on marginal ground. (V Brf
5

Morgan also concluded that Vincent irrigates just 837.12 acres, (R. 335), approximately
the same as Mclntyre. (R. 246 f3; 386 %3). Actual irrigation was disputed. (R. 415).
6

20). Vincent mischaracterizes its right. The water right is not on a turn or "scheduled"
basis. It consists of a maximum flow up to 22 cfs as needed for irrigating no more than
1051.5 acres from March 1 to October 1. (R. 493 ffi[4-6; R. 13-14). There is no
"additional water."
Vincent continues:
The law does not require Vincent to spread the reduced amounts of
water it receives each year over all of its 1,051.5 permitted acres . . .
to prevent forfeiture . . . . In a year where . . . the river is anticipated
to produce 60% of . . . the water rights, it makes sense for . . .
Vincent to plant and irrigate only 60% of its fields.
(VBrf21n.6).
Vincent assumes that reduced flow results in a one-to-one ratio in reduced
irrigated acres. Rocky Ford and beneficial use require that available water be used. The
issue is whether, at 60%, Vincent can irrigate the approved acres. It can. (R. 496 Tfl4).
At 60% of flow, Vincent receives 5163 acre-feet from March 1 to October 1, enough to
irrigate around 1291 acres at 4 acre-feet per acre. Reduced flow alone is not the test. The
test is whether there is sufficient available water to irrigate, just as in Rocky Ford the test
was whether Kents Lake stored available water. Using even the PD's figure of 5000 acre
feet, a 60% flow is sufficient, yielding around 5163 acre-feet.6

6

The math is as follows:
46 days from March 1 through April 15: 0.60 x [(46 days) x(22cfs) x
(60sec./min.) x (60min./hr.) x (24hr./day) x (lAF/43560ft3)] - 1204 af
from March 1 through April 15
168 days from April 16 to October 1 at 60% primary (accounting for 10%
storage fee): (0.90) x (0.60) x [(168 days) x (22cfs) x ( 60sec./min.) x
7

G Vincent's right is measured by beneficial use.
Vincent argues that "[t]he measure of [its] water right is 5,000 acre feet." (V Brf
28). This is wrong as a matter of law. Beneficial use is the measure. UTAH CODE ANN.
§73-1-3. See also §73-3-17(l)(certificate issued after beneficial use established); 73-4- '
12,-15 (decree issued after beneficial use determined). See Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co.
v. City of Richfield, 34 P.2d 945, 949 (Utah 1934)("Such has been the law in this
jurisdiction ever since the territory of Utah was organized.").

Beneficial use of an

irrigation right is in turn based on irrigated acres.7
Vincent then contends on the duty question that "DMADC makes this argument as
if a 'duty' figure administratively set by a state agency somehow amends or limits the
scope of a water right established . . . in a general adjudication." (V Brf 28). This is
wrong as a matter of fact. The "general adjudication" resulted in the Cox Decree, which
says nothing about a duty. The PD governs unless modified by the Decree. UTAH CODE
ANN. §73-4-11,12.

(60min./hr.) x (24hr./day) x (lAF/43560ft3)] = 3959 AF from April 16 to
October 1
Total of both periods is 1204 AF + 3959 AF = 5163 AF. This accounts for the 46 days of
60% primary where the users get the full 100% (no storage fee) and also the 168 days at
60% primary where they get 90%.
7
Since at least 1919, beneficial use for irrigation has been measured by irrigated acres.
See Ch. 67, §42 Laws of Utah (1919)("If the proposed use is for irrigation, the [water
right] application shall show . . . the total acreage . . . and the character of the soil.")(now
codified at §73-3-2(2)(a)). Even with a duty of 5000 acre-feet for 1051.5 acres, the River
Commissioner established two five year periods (1987-1991 and 1995-2001) that yielded
more than 5000 acre-feet while Mclntyre/Vincent irrigated much less than the authorized
acres. (R. 499).
8

The PD itself does not establish a duty. Rather, it identifies a volume limitation.
The trial court assumed that the PD's volume limitation constituted a duty. (R. 686). In
the absence of a decreed duty, the State Engineer administered the area under a 4 acre
foot per acre duty, a fact that Vincent acknowledged. (R. 764 at 10, 25; see also R. 178
(referring to a "diversion] limit" of "4206 acft").8 See also R. 491 (State Engineer
discussion of duty and method of irrigation).
1. The Cox Decree does not recognize a "pre-irrigation" season.
Citing to the Record at 13-14, Vincent contends that "[t]he Cox Decree . . . clearly
distinguishes between the two periods of water use . . . ." (V Brf 26). As to Vincent's
right and a "pre-irrigation season," the Cox Decree does no such thing. Rather, the
Decree addresses a storage right available between April 16 and October 1. (R. 14). For
March 1 through April 15, Vincent has a "direct diversion" right. (R. 13).
The Decree provides on the same page Vincent cites:
[Mclntyre, Vincent's predecessor] shall have the right to the use of
the water allocated to [it] respectively as above set forth, to be used
by direct diversion from March 1 to April 15, both dates inclusive.
From April 16 to October 1 in each and every year [it] shall have the
right to store and impound in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir 90% . . . ."
(R. 13-14).
The allocation "set forth above" in this passage is "22 [cfs] Mar. 1 to Oct. 1." (R.
12). That is the irrigation season. Nowhere in this description does Judge Cox suggest
that March 1 through April 15 is outside the irrigation season or that water during that

o

R. 178 is a page from the Division of Water Right records concerning Vincent's right,
and that was offered and relied on by Vincent's expert. (R. 146 ^[8).
9

period does not count. Beneficial use means that all of it counts. Thus, Vincent's
contention (V Brf 26) that
[t]he evidence showed that water available to Vincent prior to April
15 could be diverted, assuming it could be put to beneficial use
before the growing season, up to the limit of Vincent* s water right
(22.0 cfs)
is flatly wrong. The "evidence" did not show that, first because there was no evidence
about a "growing season," which may be crop-specific, and second, because the Cox
Decree does not make the "pre-irrigation season" distinction Vincent coined (R. 571 ^|3).
A central element of a water right is its authorized period of use. See, e.g., UTAH CODE
ANN. §73-3-17(6)(certificate of appropriation is prima facie evidence of the right to use
"during the time specified . . ."). Whether irrigation water can be used beneficially is
largely a fact question never litigated or decided here.
2. Vincent did not establish a physical causes defense.
Rocky Ford explains that forfeiture depends on the failure to use "available"
water, and that nonuse due to "physical causes" does not count against the user. 135 P.2d
at 112. Since 2002, the defense is statutory: "when a . . . source fails to yield sufficient
water to satisfy the water right." UTAH CODE ANN. §73-l-4(2)(e)(iii). Because water
shortage can be a defense, available water must be ascertained. The trial court looked
superficially at Vincent's right, ruling that reduced flow alone meant that this irrigation
right was not satisfied. The trial court treated Vincent's flow right as a minimum, never
asking whether the irrigation beneficial use could be satisfied with less.

10

The trial court's failure to recognize available water by reading a "pre-irrigation
season" into the Cox Decree infects the rest of the analysis and ultimately dissolved the
disputed facts. (Cf. R. 692, R. 699-701; R. 742, 746). It further rigs the question of
Vincent's actual water use. If all available water is not in the equation, the forfeiture test
and physical causes defense (under both Rocky Ford and §73-1-4) cannot work. In
addition, the available water can still be used beneficially, by storing it underground, at
least if reservoir storage is not available, as is the case in Vincent's right from March 1
through April 15. See, e.g., East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 271 P.2d 449,
453 (Utah 1954), on appeal from retrial, 300 P.2d 603 (Utah 1956. The point is, the
question of beneficial use was never litigated because the trial court accepted Vincent's
physical causes defense without including the available water and because the court ruled
incorrectly that the right could not be partially lost.
The difference is substantial. DMADC's opening brief explains that the trial
court's test years of 2002 and 2007 were mishandled because the available water was not
included.

(DMADC Brf at xxi, 21, and see R. 500, 494, f7; 497, ^15; 498

\2\\

Vincent's argument about the usefulness of water in March is a trial question. But
omitting that water as a matter of law artificially limits "available" water. Whether that
water is used beneficially is a separate, fact-intensive question. Butler, 2004 UT 67, ^[43;
and R. 415).
Vincent contends that "[t]he court's ruling [on the physical causes defense] was
based on the undisputed evidence before it, including DMADC's records {see R. at 686),"
and River Commissioner affidavits. (V Brf 28, citingR. 492-561, 587-90). Hardly. The
11

Commissioner testified that Vincent had more than sufficient flow to irrigate all 1051.5
acres, (R. 496 f14; 499), and that it typically used much less than all of its available
water. (R. 500).
Vincent also contends that the same records established that the river satisfied the
water right "in only three years since 1935. (R. at 206, 508. (See also R. at 195-206, 37181, 528-60.)." (V Brf 11 fl2). This "fact" is true only if its false premise is accepted,
that the right, measured in irrigated acres of no more than 1051.5 (V Brf 21 n.6), required
22 cfs to irrigate. The 22 cfs is a maximum. Vincent asks the Court to accept as fact that
it can irrigate with 22 cfs but not with 21. It was never disputed that less flow does not
necessarily mean less irrigation, under either the Rocky Ford or statutory test. (R. 496
1[14; 499-500).
Vincent states that "the reduced river flows prevented [it] from irrigating the full
1,051.5 acres . . . . " (V Brf 20). First, there is no record cite for this because it was never
established.

Rather, Vincent's defense was very different and uncontroversial—that

when the river yields less than the maximum flow, users are cut back proportionally. (R.
571 ^4). But they were cut back in terms of flow, not irrigated acres. What and how
much they irrigate is entirely up to them and is based on what the available water will
permit. Rocky Ford, 135 P.2d at 113. That fact question has not been answered.
To get a change application approved, Vincent claimed that it irrigated 1051.5
acres, which includes the Harder Parcel and additional area identified as the "Leamington
Parcel," (R. 247 fl 1), and the wildlife area. (R. 183, 185). Yet, it is undisputed that (1)
Vincent added the 37 acre Harder Parcel in 2006, and then only to "protect [its] water
12

right/' (R. 281), and (2) Vincent irrigates just over 20 acres of the 71.7 acre Leamington
Parcel. (R. 247 Ifll). 9
Vincent claims as fact that "[Except for the first years]... Vincent... placed all of
the water allocated . .. [by the Commissioner] to beneficial use each y e a r . . . . (V Brf 12,
T|14). This statement is false on several grounds. The River Commissioner explained that
Vincent uses on average just over 76% of its yearly total available water. (R. 500, see
Addendum). Furthermore, Vincent's water is not "allocated." The right authorizes up to
22 cfs between March 1 and October 1 (R. 493 ^[4; R. 12), and Vincent acknowledges the
beneficial use limit of 1051.5 irrigated acres. (R. 125). To demonstrate how misleading
this is, if the full water right of 22 cfs is diverted between March 1 and October 1, the
gross yield is approximately 9,332 acre feet (22 cfs = 43.60650 af per day x 214 days
between March 1 and October 1 = 9,332 acre feet). {See R. 406). Deducting the storage
portion, (R. 493-94 f6), yields 8,605 acre feet. (R. 631 f4). Not even Vincent claims
that much water.* °

The facts supporting DMADC's cross-motion were not disputed. Cf. R. 245-248; R.
355-56; R. 386-88).
10
Vincent also claims that
as of April 16, [its] right remains . . . to divert up to 22.0 cfs . . .for the
irrigation of 1,051.5 acres . . . with 5,000 acre feet of water, regardless of
whether . . . it was able to beneficially use water between March 1 and
April 15.
(V Brf 12).
This is false. The Cox Decree did not award Vincent "5000 acre feet of water." It
awarded a flow rate from March 1 to October 1. (R. 12-13). There is no beneficial use
distinction between March 1 to April 15 and the remainder of the season. The Decree
states that "the rights herein decreed are founded upon appropriations of water for
beneficial uses
" (R. 262).
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Furthermore, in terms of acreage, Vincent's beneficial use was never established.
The trial court reserved that issue. (R. 415). The cultivated acres and "wildlife habitat"
were disputed. Id. The recently added Harder 37 acres cannot count. Neither can the
double-counted and only partially irrigated Leamington Parcel. (R. 247, Tfll; R. 388,
^[11). The disputed facts dissolved as the court reconsidered and clarified its decisions,
because it ruled that the water right could not be partially lost. (Cf. R. 415; 683-87; 692;
739 (identifying the "[i]ssues remaining for trial").
Departing from the record, Vincent claims:
The Court should note that the 22 cfs flow rate for Vincent's right to
divert . . . may be measured at the point of diversion, but its 5,000
acre foot right of use is measured at the . . . farm. This is significant
because Vincent's point of diversion is seven miles up-canal from its
place of use (See R. at 182-83.) DMADC's calculations simply
based on diversion rates are all undermined by its failure to address
the significant conveyance loss [in the dirt canal . . . . as much as
30%.]. DMADC's duty argument (duty is traditionally measured at
the place of use, rather than the point of diversion) is also undercut
by its failure to account for transmission losses.
(VBrfl9,n.4).
Vincent's record cite (R. 182-83) says nothing about transmission losses or a duty.
Vincent bootstraps the duty issue into a new claim about alleged, and grossly inflated,
transmission losses. The Cox Decree provides that "all waters herein decreed shall be
and are hereby placed upon headgate duty, and the place of measurement of all waters
herein decreed shall be as near the point of diversion as is practicable." (R. 262). Neither
the Decree nor the PD provide for measuring anything at Vincent's farm. The
transmission losses have been studied and found to be approximately 4.9% and are
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publicly available, here: http://www.waterrights.utah.gov/cgi"bin/docview.exe?Folder=:TP205-750&Title-Technical+Publication+74.
Vincent claims that it was "undisputed" that the river "failed to supply sufficient
water and that Vincent beneficially used the remainder [in the wildlife habitat]." (V Brf
25). This is the heart of the dispute. The fact that Vincent may get less than 22 cfs in no
way demonstrates that it cannot irrigate. 21 cfs, or 19, or as low as approximately 11 cfs,
is still sufficient. (R. 4961(14; R. 499-500).
DMADC cannot respond in kind to Vincent's factual errors without violating this
Court's iron rule that new evidence does not come in on appeal. See State v. Law, 2003
UT App 228, f2, 75 P.3d 923(motions to supplement are inappropriate if used to
"introduce new material into the record"). DMADC can only point out the errors and say
that there is other evidence on these issues.
3. Vincent equivocates on use.
Vincent contends that DMADC "confuses irrigation with cultivation, using the
terms interchangeably . . . ." (V Brf 3 n.l). Vincent claims further to have "cultivated
some 900 acres" based on anticipated flows and that it used "additional water when
available to irrigate additional, non-cultivated land up to its 1,051.5 acre right" for other
claimed uses. Id.
Depending on who was asking, Vincent claimed (1) to be irrigating all 1051.5
acres and wildlife area (R. 268-269 (referring to R. 296), or (2) that it always irrigated all
1051.5 acres, (R. 296; 277), or (3) that it irrigated only 897 cultivated acres plus "150
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something" wildlife acres. (R. 277; R. 112 1fl9).u And none of that includes Vincent's
admission that it began irrigating an additional 37 acres in 2006 to "protect" its right. (R.
281).
D. Section 73-1-4 does not govern the abandonment claim.
Vincent argues that the abandonment claim was properly dismissed because it was
pled under §73-1-4, "invit[ing] the district court to evaluate" abandonment under a
forfeiture analysis. (V Brf 40, and see R. 7—abandonment claim). Vincent further
contends that, because DMADC failed to establish forfeiture, which is statutory, it also
failed to establish abandonment, which is not.
Section 73-l-4(2)(a) provides that "[w]hen an appropriator or the appropriator's
successor in interest abandons or ceases to use all or a portion of a water right," the right
or the unused portion is at risk . . . ." Subsection (2)(d) provides that the statute's
preceding sections apply "whether the unused or abandoned water or a portion of the
water is permitted to run to waste or is used by others without right with the knowledge
of the water right holder . . . ." Although the statute plainly says "abandon," the use of
that term is best explained as a leftover from prior versions of the statute and not as a
codification of an abandonment claim.
1. The 2008 amendments clarified the statute.
Prior to 2008, section 73-1-4 contained this language ("Ceases Phrase"):

11

Irrigating native vegetation is dicey at best. Butler, 2004 UT 67, T|55.
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When an appropriator or the appropriated s successor in
interest abandons or ceases to use all or a portion of a water
right for a period of five years, the water right or the unused
portion of that water right ceases and the water reverts to the
public [unless a timely "nonuse application" is filed].
§73-l-4(3)(a) (2002)("the 2008 amendment by ch. 380, effective May 5, 2008, rewrote
[section 73-l-4]")(emphasis added).12
The 2008 amendments removed the emphasized Ceases Phrase.
Prior to and after the 2008 amendments, section 73-1-4 contained the statute of
repose ("Repose Section") for a forfeiture claim, at section 73-l-4(3)(c)(i), now codified
at §(2)(c)(i), added in 1996. Other than extending the period of nonuse from five to
seven years, this section did not change in 2008:
A water right or a portion of the water right may not be
forfeited unless a judicial action to declare the right forfeited
is commenced within 15 years from the end of the latest
period of nonuse of at least seven years.
§73-l-4(2)(c)(i)(2009).
The Repose Section provides that a forfeiture action must be filed within fifteen
years from the end of the seventh year of nonuse (fifth year under the prior version). This
is the crux of the issue: Subsections (3)(a) and (3)(c) were in conflict—one said that an
unused water right "ceases" and "reverts to the public," seeming to strip real property by
operation of law, while the Repose Section said that no right is forfeited unless a timely
filed action results in a forfeiture judgment.
After the 2008 Amendments, the first section reads as follows:

It was never disputed that neither Mclntyre nor Vincent filed nonuse applications.
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When an appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest
abandons or ceases to use all or a portion of a water right for a
period of seven years, the water right or the unused portion of that
water right is subject to forfeiture in accordance with Subsection
(2)(c), unless the appropriator or the appropriatorfs successor in
interest files a nonuse application with the state engineer.
§73- l-4(2)(a)(emphasis added).
Therefore, from 1996, when the Repose Section was added, until 2008, when the
Ceases Phrase was deleted, the statute was internally inconsistent. The Ceases Phrase
suggests that the water right vanished with no judicial involvement, yet strangely without
any enforcement mechanism. Removing the Ceases Phrase makes it clear that no water
right is forfeited or lost until a court says it is.
That was always the law. In Jensen, this Court reversed a ruling that a water right
had been lost "by operation of law," and also held that the state engineer may not
consider a "non-adjudicated forfeiture."

2011 UT 31, ffl[9, 16. There was, in other

words, no such thing as a non-adjudicated forfeiture or an unproven abandonment. See,
e.g., Stern v. Metro. Water Dist, 2012 UT 16, 1f78-80, 274 P.3d 935 (clear and
convincing evidence of intent required to show abandonment of expresss easement).
Both always required a judgment.
2. The law on abandonment continued to develop outside of section
73-1-4.
Torsak v. Rukavina, 246 P. 367 (Utah 1926), decided while the Ceases Phrase
existed but before the Repose Section was added, held that nonuse alone does not allow
appropriation of the unused water. A plaintiff must still prove forfeiture or abandonment.
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Id. at 369. The 2008 amendments thus clarified the section to say what the law always
was—a water right is not lost in whole or part until a court declares it.
The reason for the change seems clear: A water right is and always has been a
kind of property. See UTAH CODE ANN. §57-1-1(3); and Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907,
§2498.10 ("real property" includes "water rights"). Property rights are not forfeited
unless proved by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Rosenblum v. Gomoll, 173 P.
243, 244-45 (Utah 1918) ("Forfeitures . . .should be enforced only when the proof is clear
and convincing . . . ."). See also Utah Const. Art I, §7; Wasatch County v. Okelberry,
2008 UT 10, f9, 179 P.3d 768 (clear and convincing evidence of abandonment of private
property and dedication for public use is required). Even though section 73-1-4 once
provided that an unused right "ceases," a user could still defend against forfeiture or
abandonment, as in Rocky Ford, which describes a forfeiture defense more than 50 years
before the Repose Section—requiring judicial action—was added, and while the Ceases
Phrase was there.
Moreover, abandonment has always required intent, Hammond v. Johnson et al,
66 P.2d 894, 899 (Utah 1937), and must be proved by the person asserting it. Wellsville
East Field Irrig. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 137 P.2d 634 (Utah 1943), quoted
in Provo River, etc. v. Lambert, 642 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1982). If the Ceases Phrase,
and its use of the term "abandons," was self-executing, or understood as such, there
would have been no need in 1943, before the Repose Section was added, to come to court
to prove abandonment.
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Hammond examined statutory forfeiture and held that it did not apply to a case
where the nonuse was caused by another's unlawful diversion. The Court distinguished
between abandonment and forfeiture:
There can be no abandonment of a water right unless [the user
intends] to desert, forsake, or abandon the right. A forfeiture for
nonuse[] during the statutory time may occur despite a specific
intent not to surrender the right. It is based, not upon an act done, or
an intent had but upon a failure to use the right for the statutory time.
Id at 899.
Hammond explained that "abandonment, as applied to [beneficial use], may be
defined to be an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Id. This is precisely what
DMADC pled: "Vincent . . . abandoned certain ditches and other water conveyance
systems that delivered water under the Vincent Water Right." (R. 7, ^]40).
DMADCs cite to section 73-1-4 in its complaint was unnecessary, but it does not
invoke a forfeiture analysis. The statute says nothing about intent. The case law on
abandonment developed while the Ceases Phrase existed and the statute included the
word "abandon." The section included that term, not to codify the claim, but to complete
the then-held erroneous notion, since amended, that the failure to use water ("abandons or
ceases to use") ended the right. That was not the law, but when the Ceases Phrase was
removed the term "abandon" was left behind. That term is mere residue from a prior,
conflicted version of the statute.
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Vincent contends that DMADC s appeal is weakened because it approved the form of
the judgment. (V Brf 40 n.ll). This hardly merits a response. Vincent prepared as
instructed (R. 739) a "Final Order and Judgment" consistent with the newly clarified
rulings. Because it conformed "with the court's decision," UTAH R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2),
20

CONCLUSION

In all places, at all times, beneficial use defines a water right, meaning that an
unused portion can be lost. For an irrigation right, when water is available, the lost
portion is measured in un-irrigated acres. Understanding the right itself is critical. A
municipal right is vastly different, for example, than an irrigation right.14 Under either
Rocky Ford or the statutory defense, a trial court must first determine the available water
up to the limit of the right. Only then can it determine the unused (or not beneficially
used) amount.
Here, the test is not whether the flow is less than the authorized maximum.
Rather, the test is whether the irrigation right can still be satisfied with reduced flow, and
according to Vincent it was. Vincent claims to irrigate its entire farm (R. 185) with less
than 22 cfs. (R. 146, ^[9). Perhaps less flow means that it takes longer to get the water on
the crops. But a reduced flow is by itself no excuse for failing to use available water
beneficially, particularly when Vincent admits to using limited water to enhance bird
hunting.
The trial court's perspective was irretrievably skewed by at least three
misapprehended legal issues—partial loss of a water right, physical causes defense, and
abandonment. Factually, the case is unfinished. To name only the most pressing, there

counsel approved as to form. (R. 746). Vincent concedes that every issue was preserved.
(V Brf 1). This appeal is not affected by the ministerial task of approving the form of a
judgment.
14
See, e.g., County Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954)("because
cities are creatures of constant growth, prudent civic planning requires the development
and ownership of a water supply beyond present needs.")
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were disputes about cultivated acres, irrigated acres, length of the irrigation season,
irrigation duty, irrigable acres under a reduced flow, whether irrigating natural vegetation
was beneficial, and if so, how much of that ground is irrigated, to say nothing about
whether such un-approved use is consistent with the Cox Decree.
For these reasons and the others briefed this Court should reverse and remand
while restating that the unused portion of a water right can be lost.
March ^ f , 2013.
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Addendum
Figure 2 of River Commissioner's Affidavit (R. 500).
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Figure 2 - Percentage of Total Available Water Used by Defendant (1987-2009)

Year

1

Defendant's
"Available

Defendants
"Available Water"

(March 1through April 15)

October 1)

Defendant's
Combined Total
Amount of
"Available
Water" which it
did not use (March
1 -October 1)

Defendant's
Total "Available
Water" (March
1 - October 1)
[This Comes
From the Fifth
Column of
Figure 11

Percentage of its
"Total Available
Water" Used by
Defendant
(March 1October 1)

1987

OAF

974.06 AF

947.06 AF

6923.55 AF

86.3 %

1988

87.47 AF

128.59 AF

216.06 AF

7261.68 AF

97.0 %

1989

1617.20 AF

OAF

1617.20 AF

6062.04 AF

1990

621.75 AF

699.05 AF

1320.80 AF

5018.03 AF

73.7 %

1991

1146.42 AF

OAF

1146.42 AF

5358.43 AF

78.6 %

1992

1038.06 AF

OAF

1038.06 AF

4699.22 AF

77.9 %

1993

1412.21 AF

OAF

1412.21 AF

5906.70 AF

76.1 %

1994

1435.20 AF

OAF

1435.20 AF

4765.99 AF

69.9 %

1995

1390.06 AF

648.99 AF

2039.05 AF

6837.38 AF

70.2 %

1996

265.31 AF

OAF

265.31 AF

6025.31 AF

95.6 %

1997

1826.13 AF

515.29 AF

2341.42 AF

7149.94 AF

67.3 %

1998

OAF

1430.46 AF

1430.46 AF

7546.42 AF

• 81.0%

1999

589.89 AF

1516.27 AF

2106.16 AF

7219.70 AF

70.8 %

2000

1283.39 AF

466.09 AF

1749.48 AF

5594.78 AF

68.7 %

2001

1110.43 AF

480.31 AF

1590.74 AF

5416.16AF

70.6 %

2002

1049.1 OAF

9.60 AF

1058.70 AF

4274.43 AF

75.2 %

2003

811.13AF

67.75 AF

878.88 AF

4332.31 AF

79.7 %

2004

856.40 AF

158.00 AF

1014.40 AF

4436.06 AF

77.1 %

2005

1217.69 AF

1508.56 AF

2726.16 AF

5895.65 AF

53.8 %

2006

OAF

162.86 AF

162.86 AF

5818.49 AF

97.2 %

2007

1070.99 AF

OAF

1070.99 AF

5115.58 AF

79.1 %

2008

1205.47 AF

1.77 AF

1207.24 AF

5464.73 AF

77.9 %

2009

1

801.97 AF

1

1

4.46 AF

1

806.43 AF

9

j

1

4895.96 AF

'1

1

73.3 %

83.5 %

